The long-standing conflict between the two theories centers about the question whether time can exist independently of that which is in it. Those who advocate absolute time answer in the affirmative while the relationists take the opposite position claiming that temporal relations, and thus time, have no reality apart from the things and events which they order. In the terminology of Paul Weiss, relational time is "concrete." The considerable emphasis placed upon this issue of the concreteness of time has adversely (...) affected the absolute theory, leading to presentations of the absolutist position that are confusing, if not erroneous. Absolute time, as interpreted by philosophers such as Broad, Gunn, and Whitehead, posits the existence of abstract moments which are arranged in serial order one before the other by virtue of relations of precedence between them. Things and events participate in time only vicariously, so to speak, being joined to their respective moments by another kind of relation which Whitehead calls "occupation." The overall structure presented by the absolute theory is therefore thought to be as follows: one event is before another if both are respectively bound by relations of occupation to moments which are in turn so related as to be one before the other. Relational time mercifully simplifies this picture by a neat bit of surgery, cutting away the abstract moments and tying the relations of precedence directly to things and events themselves. As a consequence, the parasitic relations of occupation wither away. (shrink)

First it will be necessary to examine the argument, and the meaning of the argument, by which Mr. Ingram-Pearson is led to uphold such an unusual position. Using the statement, "fairies do not exist," as his example, he observes: "In order to achieve its obvious status as a denial this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all." What, then, is the designate (...) of the term "fairies"? It is, we are told, "an existent [italics mine] which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there." To say that "fairies do not exist" is therefore to say that "certain entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are not present in the world," or "specific entities, designated by the term 'fairies,' are really absent from the world." The latter statement is positive, and Mr. Ingram-Pearson tells us explicitly that positive statements cannot "succeed in making intelligible" something made intelligible by negative statements about non-existents; but he has in mind such "ordinary" positive statements as "fairies are imagined beings." In other words, it is not that negative statements about. (shrink)

In this paper I shall examine creation and annihilation in time rather than solipsism of the moment. The argument will focus upon a difficulty raised by the creationist's qualification of the solipsist's denial of past and future. The solipsist maintains that the words "past" and "future" have no object of reference; hence, statements denying their existence, like such statements as "Fairies do not exist" and "Santa Claus does not exist," convey the idea that there simply are no existents to which (...) the subject terms refer. At no point can we accuse the solipsist of making the absurd claim that some existents do not exist, and yet that is precisely the claim which the creationist makes; for his subject term refers to some existent—something which does exist or did exist—and then he denies the existence of that existent. Indeed, he cannot express himself without granting existence, on the one hand, and denying it, on the other, so that he appears at the very outset to be involved in a contradiction. If the following argument is correct, it will prove that the contradiction is not merely apparent but real, and that the creationist is confronted by it as soon as he says what he wants to say in whatever idiom he chooses to say it. (shrink)